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ABSTRACT 
Privacy is an important property that is growing harder to keep as people develop new 
ways to steal information from users on their computers. Software alone cannot ensure 
privacy since an infected system is untrustworthy. 
This paper presents several challenges malware brings that can be solved by using an 
external processor. Techniques such as keystroke encryption and message authentication 
can be used to protect users from having their passwords and other private data stolen. 
To take advantage of the external hardware, a physical unclonable function can be used 
to generate private keys without the need for storing them in memory. In this report, a 
design of a physical unclonable function is detailed and designed for use on an FPGA. 
Two different types of hardware design software are briefly discussed for the purpose of 
choosing the superior tool for creating a PUF on an FPGA. 
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GLOSSARY 
Ammeter. An instrument that can determine the amount of electrical current being drawn. 
ASIC. Application-Specific Integrated Circuit. An integrated circuit customized for a specific 
purpose.  
FPGA. Field-Programmable Gate Array. An integrated circuit that can be configured by a 
user after the manufacturing of the circuit.  
Keylogger. A software or device that can log everything that has been typed on a keyboard.  
MAC. Message Authentication Code. Used to authenticate a message and check to see if it 
has been modified. 
PUF. An acronym for Physical Unclonable Function. 
Physical Unclonable Function. A function implemented on hardware that provides an 
unpredictable output to an input. ASICs with identical PUFs will give a different output to a 
same input. 
Public-Key Cryptography. A cryptographic system that uses a pair of private and public 
keys. Both keys are needed to encrypt and decrypt data. 
Symmetric-Key Algorithm. Cryptographic algorithms that use the same private key for 
encryption and decryption.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As time passes, new software techniques are developed that make it more difficult to 
detect and remove malware from personal computers. A system that has had a rootkit 
installed can potentially steal data and never be discovered by antivirus software. The 
malware can be designed to deactivate and hide whenever the system is being scanned. 
Much more dangerous malware can attack and deactivate the protection that a system 
was using to ensure a user’s protection. 
Once a computer has been infected, it can no longer be trusted to handle private data. It 
may not even be possible to know if the system has been infected or not. It is for these 
reasons that software alone cannot perfectly protect a system and the privacy of any 
individual. 
If we cannot trust antivirus software to protect our systems, then how can we ever safely 
and securely give our computers sensitive personal information? Personal information 
such as passwords, credit card numbers, social security numbers, and addresses can be 
stolen and used to steal identities or money stored in a bank. Everyone from an average 
person to a high-ranking government employee is at risk of losing data that other people 
should not get a hold of. 
This document will focus on preventing one of the simplest ways that data can be stolen: 
keyloggers. Since a user’s computer cannot be trusted to keep information perfectly 
secured, some of the responsibility for keeping information safe should be given to 
another device that cannot be controlled or tricked by an infected system. 
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Existing techniques and technologies will be explored to find a combination that could 
theoretically secure a computer from any keylogger threat. Such techniques include 
encryption, message authentication, and electrical current detection. Physical unclonable 
functions are explored as a way to improve the security of the hardware system. A simple 
design of a PUF is discussed and placed on an FPGA. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section will discuss what a keylogger is and the types that exist. Generally, a 
keylogger can be in the form of hardware or software.  
2.1. Software Keylogger 
These keyloggers are programs that can capture what a user types using several different 
ways. There are 2 common types of software keyloggers: kernel-based keyloggers and 
application based keyloggers [1], [2]. An application keylogger can use the Windows 
hooking APIs to log what key has been pressed. Kernel-based keyloggers reside within 
the kernel and replace the driver that normally reads from the keyboard. 
Both types of software keyloggers are installed as a result of something a user did [3]. 
The keylogger could have been installed by a malicious email attachment, a website 
script that exploits a browser vulnerability, or by other malware that may download and 
install the malicious software. These keyloggers all capture keystrokes and stores them 
into a file that may be sent over the Internet to the hacker at some point. 
2.2. Hardware Keylogger 
Hardware keyloggers are physical devices that must be installed on the system to log 
keystrokes. There are two categories of hardware keyloggers: external and internal [2]. 
Regardless of the type, a hardware keylogger requires physical access to the target 
computer in order to install and retrieve the device.  
Since these keyloggers can passively monitor and log keystrokes, it is undetectable by 
software on a computer. The keyloggers have an internal memory that it uses to store 
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every keystroke. To access the data, a password must be typed in the keyboard that the 
keylogger is connected to. The keylogger will then start typing the captured data into the 
computer. By acting as a keyboard, the keylogger can display its memory contents 
without the need of software that would be detected by antivirus. 
2.2.1. External Keyloggers 
External hardware keyloggers are devices that are plugged inline with the keyboard and 
plugged directly into a port on the computer. Figure 2-1 shows an example of how an 
external keylogger would be connected to a keyboard and pc. Since it is out in the open, 
they can be spotted and removed. On a desktop PC, however, keyboards are most likely 
connected to a port on the back of the pc. Unless inspected regularly, they may never be 
noticed. This type of keylogger cannot be used on a laptop computer unless the user of 
the notebook regularly uses a dock with a separate keyboard. 
 
Figure 2-1: External Hardware Keylogger Connection 
2.2.2. Internal Keyloggers 
Internal keyloggers are circuits that are placed inside the pc or the keyboard. When 
placed within the PC, they are usually PCI cards that can be installed into an open slot of 
a desktop PC or notebook [2]. For keyboards, the internal keyloggers are circuit boards 
that are fitted into the existing circuitry of the keyboard. The keyboard must be 
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dismantled so that the keylogger can be installed. Keyboards with keyloggers built in can 
also be purchased. 
The main advantage of using internal hardware keyloggers is that they will be hidden 
from plain view. It may be more difficult to install since it requires the disassembling of 
the target device to install the keylogger and to retrieve it. Rather than attempt to modify 
the keyboard, the keylogger user could swap out the target keyboard with an identical 
model that has the keylogger preinstalled. The same process can be used to retrieve the 
keylogger. 
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3. STATE OF THE ART IN KEYLOGGER PROTECTION 
As keyloggers are capable of stealing information easily, there have been ways developed 
to help keep a user’s privacy. 
3.1. KeyScrambler 
This software, developed by the QFX Software Corporation, protects users from software 
keyloggers by encrypting keystrokes [4]. The software encrypts keystrokes at the driver 
level, making it more difficult for software keyloggers to bypass the encryption. Any 
software keyloggers that are in the system and not in the kernel will only be able to 
capture the encrypted keystrokes. KeyScrambler decrypts the data once the keystroke 
arrives to the destination application. 
The KeyScrambler software uses Blowfish for 128-bit symmetric-key encryption and 
RSA for 1024-bit asymmetric-key encryption. Unlike traditional antivirus, the software 
does not rely on knowing the signatures of keyloggers to stop information theft. This has 
the advantage of being able to defeat known and unknown software keyloggers in the 
system. Traditional antivirus would only be able to detect keyloggers that have been 
previously discovered and logged in a virus dictionary [5].  
KeyScrambler’s protection is active and will prevent a software keylogger from stealing 
unencrypted data. A traditional antivirus may not have detected a keylogger until data has 
already been stolen. This may be because the antivirus did not have a signature for the 
malware, or it did not detect suspicious behavior until it was too late. 
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3.2. Antivirus and Symantec Striker System 
Symantec’s Striker system aims to improve the way antivirus software detects malware. 
Traditional antivirus software has two tactics for detecting viruses: signature-based 
detection and behavior-based detection [5]. As was discussed in the previous section, 
signature-based detection is not very effective when it comes to detecting newly created 
viruses, since they may not have been added to a dictionary yet. Another problem arises 
when we consider the existence of polymorphic viruses. These viruses have the capability 
of encrypting every new infection, changing the signature of the virus, rendering the 
signature-based detection schemes useless [6]. 
Through behavior-based detection, antivirus software can detect suspicious activity and 
flag the program. Antivirus software can passively detect suspicious activity by scanning 
running programs and checking for deviations in activity. Antivirus software can actively 
detect suspicious behavior by executing a program within a virtual machine and checking 
to see if it matches criteria to be labeled malware. Behavior based detection allows 
antivirus software to detect any malware that matches its negative criteria, regardless if 
the malware has been added to a signature dictionary. 
The Symantec Striker system improves upon the behavior-based detection by reducing 
the overhead of active scanning [6]. When running a program, instead of relying of 
heuristic guesses, it will examine behavior and rule out common malware behavior from 
a database. For example, if the scanned program infects EXE files, Striker will strike 
from the list any viruses that scan other file types. It will continue striking from the list 
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until it rules out all potential viruses. This method is faster than a normal heuristic-based 
system. 
3.3. Dynamic Taint Analysis 
This technique attempts to detect the existence of kernel-based keyloggers by tainting 
data [7]. Kernel-based keyloggers are capable of hiding their presence from antivirus 
software and are hard to detect. If tainted data has been modified, this can be detected and 
the cause of the modification can be found. If the cause of the modification is not from a 
legitimate source, then it is assumed to have been the cause of a malicious program. 
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4. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Though we may have effective antivirus and privacy software, can we ever be fully 
protected from keyloggers? Could we improve our protection by using hardware-based 
security? 
4.1. Weaknesses of Current Technology 
Though the KeyScrambler software seems to have a great solution to preventing data 
theft from keyloggers, there are vulnerabilities that exist that prevent it from being a 
perfect solution. Since KeyScrambler is software that resides in the kernel, any software 
keylogger that has managed to be installed within the kernel would not be affected by this 
protection. Furthermore, KeyScrambler cannot prevent hardware keyloggers from 
capturing keystrokes directly from the keyboard, as shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1: Keystroke Data Flow 
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Antivirus software can detect most malware, but hackers are learning new ways to hide 
malware within a system. Rootkits operate below the operating system and can control 
processes that are seen by the computer [8]. Malware with full control of a computer 
could corrupt the antivirus software to prevent it from being able to detect infections. One 
of the most powerful features of a rootkit is that it is capable of reinstalling itself from 
hidden area on the system after it has been removed.  
Even with a more accurate detection of kernel-based keyloggers, as can be done using 
taint analysis, this does not prevent the problem of keyloggers. The researchers 
themselves question if a keylogger could be designed to bypass the taint analysis [7]. 
They mention that the taint detection could be broken if the keylogger uses other types of 
write operations. 
4.2. Importance of Privacy 
It goes without saying, that a great amount of damage could be caused if private sensitive 
information is stolen. In 2003, the source code for the unreleased video game Half Life 2 
was stolen [9]. They stole enough of the data to be able to release a playable version 
within five days. The computers at the Valve game company had been infected with 
software keyloggers that their antivirus tools were unable to detect. 
In another incident in 2003, JuJu Jiang installed software keyloggers at 13 different 
Kinko Internet café stores spread around Manhattan [10]. He managed to steal banking 
credentials of about 450 different people. With the information that he stole, he was able 
to create fake bank accounts and use them to transfer money from the real bank accounts 
that he stole the information from. 
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In 2011, two hardware keyloggers were found on computers in libraries located in 
Manchester [11]. Library staff that was inspecting a malfunctioning computer found the 
keyloggers. It is unknown who installed the hardware keyloggers or how long the scam 
has been going on for. The computers are protected with software that prevents people 
from installing software on the accounts of the machines. The hardware keyloggers was a 
work around to stealing data from people that use these public computers. 
In 2013, malicious links have appeared on the popular website Facebook [12]. These 
links would lead to a website that would discretely install the Trojan horse named Zeus. 
This Zeus malware would use keyloggers to steal private login information for bank 
accounts. The malware gives very little warning signs to a user, such as crashing the pc, 
since its only purpose is to steal information.  Facebook has suggested that users should 
take steps into protecting themselves from malicious links posted by others [13]. 
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5. EXTERNAL HARDWARE SOLUTION 
Various solutions to the problems brought up in section 4 are covered. Each of the 
following solutions may have their own possible problems that are also discussed and 
solved. 
The main purpose of this report is to show how using an external piece of hardware can 
improve protection from any keylogger. Since the hardware is not a part of the computer, 
it cannot be modified by any malware that may be on the system, provided that the 
hardware was designed in a way that would not allow the system to alter functionality 
without a user’s permission. 
As shown in Figure 5-1, the hardware would be placed between the keyboard and the 
computer. The main purpose of the hardware would be to encrypt keystrokes a user 
would input and send the computer the encrypted keystroke that a keylogger would 
capture. The encrypted keystroke would then be decrypted on the pc and sent to the target 
application. 
The following sections will explain in detail how the external hardware protection system 
will work, and how the system should be designed. For simplicity and clarity, the 
external hardware solution discussed will be referred to as the External Keylogger 
Barrier, or EKB. 
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Figure 5-1: Diagram of External Hardware Protection Connection 
5.1. Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) 
One huge advantage to using a hardware solution is being able to use a physical 
unclonable function for cryptographic functions. Physical unclonable functions, or PUFs, 
are circuits that are capable of generating unique responses to inputs [14]. A PUF 
response is determined by the physical characteristics of the integrated circuit; two 
Identical PUFs will have unique outputs to the same input, since transistors will have 
slight differences in its inherent delay [15]. Traditionally, secret keys used for 
cryptographic functions are stored on nonvolatile memory within a chip that is vulnerable 
to invasive attacks [15]. A PUF does not need to store the key and can generate it’s 
unique response at start up. The main problem with a PUF is the reliability of a stable 
output, but research has been done improving the quality of a PUF [14]–[16]. 
5.1.1. PUF Implementation 
According to [15], an RO PUF (ring oscillator PUF) can be easily implemented on an 
ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) or FPGA (field-programmable gate array). 
An RO PUF is based on delay loops and counters; the delay loop (ring oscillators) will 
have different delay times that’s are determined by variations in the manufacturing of the 
transistors within a circuit. 
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An example of a ring oscillator can be seen in Figure 5-2. This ring oscillator was 
designed using the Quartus II design software. It has five stages of inversion that will 
create an oscillation and includes a NAND logic gate with an enable input to turn the 
oscillator off. Each oscillator will have a different frequency due to variations in the 
transistors within each of the logic gates. 
 Enable 
OUT 
NAND2 
NOT NOT NOT NOT 
 
Figure 5-2: Five-Stage Ring Oscillator 
Figure 5-3 shows a general design of an RO PUF. The RO PUF contains two 
multiplexers, two counters, a comparator circuit, and several ring oscillators. The RO 
PUF generates an output by comparing the frequencies of two oscillators by counting the 
amount of times it has oscillated. If the first oscillator causes is faster, the comparator 
will output a logical true, otherwise, a logical false. 
 
Figure 5-3: Ring Oscillator PUF 
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The RO PUF can generate different outputs depending on the input. The input goes into 
each of the multiplexers to select two of the oscillators. The oscillators chosen will 
increment the counter while it is enabled. When the oscillator is disabled, the counted 
value can be compared and give a logical true if the first counter has a higher value, i.e. 
the first oscillator has a higher oscillating frequency. 
The RO PUF can be designed to cater to different cryptographic needs. The following 
sections will discuss how a PUF can be used to increase the security of the EKB. The 
next chapter will go in depth in how to implement a PUF into an FPGA. 
5.2. Keystroke Encryption 
Encryption is the EKB’s main form of protection against hardware keyloggers. The 
process is shown in Figure 5-4. Any keystrokes input by the user will be encrypted on the 
EKB and sent to the computer as keystrokes. Any software keylogger on the system will 
capture the encrypted keystrokes and gain no information about what has been written. 
Secure software will then decrypt the keystroke and send the unencrypted data to the 
user’s target application. 
 
Figure 5-4: EKB Encrypting Keystrokes 
The computer receives encrypted keystrokes as if the user was typing them. Any software 
keylogger would just record the encrypted keystrokes. The keylogger would not be able 
 16 
to capture the unencrypted keystrokes, no matter how deep within the system it may be, 
since the keystrokes are encrypted by the EKB before they arrive to the computer. 
5.2.1. Encryption Implementation 
According to [17], symmetric-key algorithms can be implemented highly efficiently on 
hardware. This is because symmetric-key algorithms use table look-ups and bit-wise 
operations that can be parallelized to have higher performance than a software 
implementation of the same encryption algorithm. 
Since the user’s keystrokes are always being encrypted in this system, it is important for 
both the EKB and the software to quickly and efficiently encrypt/decrypt data. In order 
for a symmetric-key encryption to work, the decryption software on the system must have 
the key that was used to encrypt the data. Figure 5-5 shows how the decryption algorithm 
requires the same key that was used to encrypt the original plaintext data. In order to keep 
the system secure, the same key must not be used more than once; a new key must be 
generated each time a new session is started. The EKB and the decryption software must 
be able to share a key before they can start encrypting and decrypting keystrokes. 
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Figure 5-5: Example of Symmetric-Key Encryption 
5.2.1.1. Key Sharing 
The EKB and the decryption software must be capable of privately sharing a key to take 
advantage of symmetric-key encryption. An asymmetric-key algorithm can be used to 
encrypt the symmetric key and share it with the decryption software. Asymmetric-key 
algorithms work by creating a public key that is used to encrypt data that can only be 
decrypted using a private key. Since no prior shared secret is needed for decryption, this 
method can be used initially to securely share keys for the symmetric-key encryption. 
Figure 5-6 shows a diagram of how public-key encryption generally works. The EKB 
would use its own private key in combination with the PC’s public key to encrypt any 
data. The cipher text is then sent to the PC to be decrypted. The PC must use its own 
private key in combination with EKB’s public key to decrypt the data. It is important that 
each of the public keys are verified to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack. 
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Figure 5-6: Public-Key Encryption Example 
5.2.2. PUF Authentication 
The PUF can be used to allow the PC to authenticate the EKB to prevent a man-in-the 
middle attack. In a public-key algorithm, this attack works by substituting the public keys 
with the attacker’s keys so that the attacker is able to decrypt any cipher text. The 
attacker can then encrypt the text back using the original public keys so that the presence 
of the attacker is not discovered. To prevent this, a MAC (message authentication code) 
can be used to verify that the PC is communicating with the EKB. 
As mentioned in section 5.1.1, a PUF will generate a unique output on different ASICs, 
and it is not possible to predict the output response of a PUF for any input. Using this 
property, it is possible to authenticate a device by giving the PUF a challenge input and 
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checking to see is the output matches a stored result [15]. Figure 5-7 shows a diagram of 
how the PUF output can be used in a MAC algorithm. Since a man-in-the-middle cannot 
predict a PUF response to a challenge, the attacker cannot modify EKB’s public key 
without invalidating the MAC; the attacker cannot create a new MAC since the PUF 
response is not known. The software on the PC checks to see if the key has been modified 
by generating the MAC and checking to see if it matches the received MAC. 
 
Figure 5-7: PUF Message Authentication 
Once the public keys have been authenticated, the public-key algorithm can be used to 
share the private keys for symmetric-key encryption. The EKB can also send the software 
new PUF challenge and response pairs for future authentication. 
5.3. Hardware Keylogger Detection 
Encrypting keystrokes will protect data from being stolen by software keyloggers, but 
hardware keyloggers require another solution. Figure 5-8 shows that the effectiveness of 
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keystroke encryption depends on the placement of the hardware keylogger. If the 
keylogger were connected between the pc and the EKB, then the keylogger would only 
capture encrypted data. If the hardware keylogger were placed between the keyboard and 
the EKB, then it would be able to capture the unencrypted data.  
 
Figure 5-8: Keystroke Encryption Effectiveness Against Hardware Keyloggers 
Though the vulnerability shown in Figure 5-8 exists, there is the advantage that the 
hardware keylogger would be easier to spot since it would not be hidden behind the pc, 
where the keyboard is likely to be connected. There are techniques that can be 
implemented on the EKB to detect the presence of a hardware keylogger. 
5.3.1. Electrical Current Change Detection 
In order for the hardware keylogger to be able to log any data, it must be connected in 
line with the keyboard. Connecting the keylogger to the keyboard can cause a noticeable 
change in the amount of electrical current drawn, since there is now additional hardware 
to power [18], [19]. Since software within a computer has no way of detecting a current 
change, this method of detecting hardware keyloggers cannot be used.  
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An ammeter is an instrument that can measure the electrical current in a circuit. If the 
EKB had an ammeter, it would be able to detect any changes made to the keyboard setup 
by comparing the amount of electrical current the keyboard is pulling to the amount of 
current that the keyboard normally pulls. If the amount of current drawn by the keyboard 
is higher than is normally expected of that keyboard, it should raise a flag and alert the 
user of a suspicious device. 
5.3.2. Signal Propagation Time Increase Detection 
Another way to detect a hardware keylogger is to detect an increase in the signal 
propagation time. The microprocessor within the keylogger needs to process the signal 
from the keyboard, and will make a noticeable propagation delay [18]. Since the delay 
created by the hardware keylogger is very small, a computer wouldn’t be able to measure 
the delay accurately enough unless the detection program had exclusive access to the 
CPU [18]. 
The EKB can be designed to check the signal propagation time by pinging the keyboard. 
The normal propagation time for the keyboard can be stored for later use. If the EKB 
detects a greater propagation time, compared to the previously stored value, it should 
throw a flag and notify the user of suspicious hardware. 
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6. FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF A PUF 
While an RO PUF can be easily implemented into an FPGA, there are some strict 
requirements that need to be placed in order for it to work correctly [14]–[16], [20]–[22]. 
This chapter will cover the process of creating a PUF that is capable of working on an 
FPGA device. 
6.1. RO PUF Design Considerations 
As was stated in earlier in section 5.1.1, on page 13, a ring oscillator PUF is easy to 
implement on an FPGA. The reason RO PUFs are easier to implement is because there is 
only a single constraint that must be followed; every ring oscillator needs to be 
identically laid out [15]. Other types of PUFs, such as the arbiter PUF and butterfly PUF, 
require all interconnections between the gates to be identical [15], [20]. This constraint is 
what helped to decide which software was used to implement the PUF. 
6.1.1. Choosing the Design Software 
Altera Quartus II was the first software that was considered for designing the PUF for an 
FPGA. This is where problems occurred. After testing the RO PUF on multiple Altera 
brand FPGAs, the PUF did not give unique outputs. The RO PUF derives its unique 
response from the random variations from manufacturing that would cause different 
oscillation frequencies in each ring oscillator. 
6.1.1.1. Understanding Ring Oscillator Delay 
To understand why the Altera Quartus II software was not effective, the basic idea of 
how the RO PUF works will be explained. RO PUFs take two of the ring oscillators and 
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compares the frequencies. The frequency is determined by the delay throughout the 
oscillator circuit. 
RSN ddd    (1) 
Equation 1 shows the delay, Nd , that is present in a ring oscillator [20]. Variable Sd  is 
the static delay caused by the routing of the gates, while Rd  is the random delay caused 
by variations in the manufacturing of the transistors within the logic gates.  
21 RRR ddd   (2) 
21 SSS ddd   (3) 
RSRRSS ddddddd  2121  (4) 
Equation 2 shows the difference between the random delay of two different oscillators, 
and equation 3 shows the difference in the static routing delay between the same two 
oscillators. Equation 4 is the difference between the total delays of the two oscillators. 
For the RO PUF to have a unique response in every ASIC, the ring oscillator frequency 
must be determined by random delays [20]. To achieve this, every RO must be laid out 
identically. With identical layout, the static delays can be assumed to be equal in every 
RO. 
RRRSS dddddd  21  (5) 
With identical static delays, the RO PUF result can be determined by just the random 
delays, as shown in equation 5. If the static delays are not equal, then the RO PUF results 
will be partially dependant on the static delays [20]. If the static delays are greater than 
the random delays, the result of all PUFs will be static and prevent unique response. 
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6.1.1.2. Problem with Altera Quartus II 
Testing the RO PUF on FPGA boards showed that there was not enough random delay to 
provide unique PUF outputs. The ring oscillators had not been identically laid out prior to 
the tests.  
The major problem with Quartus II was the lack of tools to route out the oscillators 
identically. According to [22], there is no function in the software to define a layout that 
can be applied to every oscillator. The user must individually and manually route every 
ring oscillator. Figure 6-1 shows why this is infeasible for even small RO PUF designs. 
The PUF shown contains 128 ring oscillators that would have to be manually routed to 
achieve the unique results of a PUF. 
 
Figure 6-1: Quartus RTL View of RO PUF with 128 Ring Oscillators 
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6.1.1.3. Choosing Xilinx ISE 
Xilinx is a common choice for implementing the RO PUF. The Xilinx software has a 
feature called hard-macro that allows a user to create a logical function that has been 
defined from components of a specific device family. This feature was used by [14]–[16], 
[20] to create a hard-macro of a ring oscillator to ensure that they are all identical. This 
single feature made Xilinx a perfect choice to design a PUF for. 
6.1.2. General RO PUF Design 
For the purposes of this paper, a simple RO PUF was designed. Figure 5-3, from page 14, 
presented the design of a single RO PUF. To simplify the circuit for testing purposes, the 
RO PUF was placed multiple times in parallel to have multiple output bits. The FPGA 
used was the Nexys 3. Since the Nexys 3 has 8 LEDs, eight PUFs were placed in parallel 
to create an eight-bit output. This larger output size made testing for uniqueness easier. 
6.2. Designing the RO PUF 
As mentioned in section 6.1.2, the Nexys 3 FPGA was used to test the RO PUF. A hard-
macro of a ring oscillator was created to create identical layouts. Figure 6-2 shows a five-
stage ring oscillator that was created into a hard-macro. This macro was used in VHDL 
code as a component to create the RO PUF. Figure 6-3 shows every component that went 
into the VHDL version of the design from Figure 5-3. 
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Figure 6-2: Five-Stage Ring Oscillator Hard Macro in Xilinx FPGA Editor 
 
 
Figure 6-3: RTL View in Xilinx of single RO PUF 
6.2.1. Controlling the RO PUF 
The RO PUF on its own cannot create a useful output unless there’s a state machine to 
control the functions of the circuit. Figure 6-4 shows the top level of the RO PUF that 
includes a state machine. This state machine controlled several parts of the PUF. The 
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state machine can make the counter reset its values, and enable or disable to incrementing 
of the counter. The state machine also enabled the ring oscillators for several clock cycles 
to allow the counters to accumulate oscillations from the two oscillators being compared. 
 
Figure 6-4: Top Level of RO PUF 
6.2.2. Hard-Macro Placements 
Hard-macros require a user to place each macro to a location on the FPGA. To save time, 
this process was automated by using VHDL. 
for I in 0 to RO_Width-1 generate 
     ---Sets the location of RO on the Nexys 3 FPGA 
     attribute LOC of ROX : label is "SLICE_X"&INTEGER'image(ro_row * 
4)&"Y"& INTEGER'image(I+9); 
 
In the above code snippet, for each RO generated, a different location is assigned to the 
macro. The above values are specific to the Nexys 3 FPGA and the five-stage RO hard-
macro.  
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6.3. Testing on FPGA 
The RO PUF that was tested was a small circuit. There were 8 PUFs to give an 8-bit 
output. The 8 bits of the output were assigned to each of the LEDs on the Nexys 3 board. 
The RO PUF was tested on 2 separate FPGAs and had different results, which proved 
that the RO PUF could work on an FPGA. All of the VHDL files necessary to compile 
this PUF are in appendix A. 
The best way to test the PUF for uniqueness is to take multiple FPGAs and give each 
board identical inputs and checking to see if the boards give unique outputs. If the results 
are matching, then there is too much static array and reduces the effectiveness of the 
random delays.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
Software keyloggers and hardware keyloggers have been used to steal sensitive data such 
as passwords and credit card numbers. Keyloggers can be very hard to detect even by the 
best antivirus software, leaving many people vulnerable to loss of privacy. A better 
solution to the problem of keyloggers is to prevent keyloggers from getting your data in 
the first place. 
Encrypting keystrokes prevents both software and hardware keyloggers from stealing the 
plaintext data. By encrypting the keystrokes from outside of the pc, it impossible for 
keyloggers to steal the plaintext keystrokes without the private key used to decrypt the 
cipher text. 
Hardware keyloggers will also not be able to steal plaintext keystrokes if it is connected 
to the output of the keystroke encryption device. If it is placed before the encryption 
device, it will most likely be easier for a user to discover its existence in the system and 
be removed. Several techniques for detecting the hardware keylogger can also be 
employed. A hardware keylogger will increase the amount of electrical current drawn by 
the keyboard. An ammeter would be able to detect the current change and alert the user 
that a keylogger is on the system and should be immediately removed. A hardware 
keylogger can also cause a delay in the time it takes for a keystroke to propagate. By 
timing the amount of time it took for a keystroke to arrive, it can determine if there was a 
delay caused by a keylogger. 
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Using a hardware solution to keyloggers brings many benefits that a software solution 
alone would not bring. Symmetric-key algorithms can be implemented highly efficiently 
on hardware by parallelizing it. A PUF can be used to authenticate anything the device 
sends to the PC to prevent the communications from being intercepted by a man-in-the-
middle attack. The threat of hardware keyloggers can be eliminated through the use of 
techniques that cannot be implemented by software.  
7.1. Weaknesses 
There are several weaknesses that a hardware solution may have. On the boot up of a pc, 
the software for decrypting keystrokes may not be active until the system has loaded. 
This may allow a kernel level keylogger to steal the login password before the device is 
able to encrypt data. Another weakness is the security of the private keys. A new private 
key is generated for each session, but if the private key is stolen from the memory of the 
PC, the encrypted data may be able to be decrypted. 
7.2. Future Research 
Some research into how to protect the software from being targeted by malware should 
be looked into. Some malware use polymorphic code to avoid detection from antivirus 
software. Perhaps polymorphism can be implemented to protect software from being 
modified by malware. By constantly changing the way the code runs, a virus may not be 
able to find the private key within the memory of the system.  
7.2.1. Executable Polymorphism 
Having the executable of the software reside on the external device to prevent 
modifications by a virus could increase the security of the system. The device could be 
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designed to modify the executable so that it is different each time it is run on the system. 
This could prevent a virus from being able to target certain memory addresses and inject 
instructions or steal private keys. A PUF could be used to digitally sign the executable to 
check if the code has been modified after having been loaded into the system’s memory. 
7.2.2. PUF Reliability 
If a PUF is used for digital signatures, the PUF must be able to reliably generate a 
constant private key for cryptographic functions. A PUF output can be affected by the 
temperature or by the input voltage. Research must be done to allow a PUF to give a 
stable result under any operating conditions.  
In the case of a RO PUF, a possible solution is to determine which ring oscillator pairs 
are more likely to cause an unstable result. This can be determined by checking the 
oscillation frequencies under normal conditions. If the frequencies are very close, then it 
should be considered as a possible unstable pair. This should be recorded on volatile 
memory with the result stored. Next time a PUF output is requested, the volatile memory 
should be checked for any unstable pairs used. If there is a match, then the result stored in 
memory should be used in place of the less reliable puff output. 
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8. APENDIX A: SOURCE CODE 
8.1. Ring Oscillator Array 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.all; 
 
---RO_Width: Choose how many RO there are 
---RO_Row:Used by upper level entities to make  
----------the automation of attributing locations to 
----------each RO easier. 
 
---En: Enables the RO to oscillate. 
---OS: The output of the RO. 
entity RO_Array is 
  generic (RO_Width : integer := 64; 
              ro_row : integer :=1); 
  port( En: in std_logic_vector(RO_Width-1 downto 0); 
        Os: out std_logic_vector(RO_Width-1 downto 0)); 
      
end RO_Array; 
 
architecture block_diagram of RO_Array is 
 
    component five_stage_ro 
      port(En : in  std_logic; 
           Os : out std_logic); 
    end component; 
     
    attribute LOC : string; 
 
    begin 
     
    GEN_RO:  
    for I in 0 to RO_Width-1 generate 
     ---Sets the location of RO on the Nexys 3 FPGA 
     attribute LOC of ROX : label is "SLICE_X"&INTEGER'image(ro_row * 
4)&"Y"& INTEGER'image(I+9); 
     begin 
      ROX : five_stage_ro  
        port map(En(I), Os(I)); 
    end generate GEN_RO; 
 
end block_diagram; 
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8.2. Decoder 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.all; 
use ieee.numeric_std.all; 
 
----Decoder is used to activate specific RO for PUF 
entity Decoder is 
  ----The width is how many bits will be needed to address all RO 
  ----Should be set to log_2(number of RO) 
  generic (Sel_Width : integer := 8); 
  port( en: in std_logic; 
        inA, inB: in std_logic_vector(Sel_Width-1 downto 0); 
        output: out std_logic_vector(2**Sel_Width-1 downto 0)); 
      
end Decoder; 
 
architecture block_diagram of Decoder is 
begin 
process(inA, inB, en) 
begin 
   ---Set output bits to 0 to deavtivate all RO 
    output <= (others => '0'); -- default 
     
    ---activate RO corrspoending to inA 
    output(to_integer(unsigned(inA))) <= en; 
      
    ---activate RO corresponding to inB 
    output(to_integer(unsigned(inB))) <= en; 
end process; 
end block_diagram; 
 
8.3. PUF Bit 
----- CELL Compare ----- 
--entity that does bit comparisons 
   
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.all; 
use ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all; 
 
entity my_COMPARE is 
port( 
    A, B   : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
    GTh  : out std_logic 
  ); 
end my_COMPARE; 
 
architecture arch_comp of my_COMPARE is 
begin 
      
  GTh <= '1' when ( A > B ) else '0'; 
 
 34 
end arch_comp; 
 
 
----- CELL Counter ----- 
--entity that counts the oscillations of RO 
 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_ARITH.ALL; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_UNSIGNED.ALL; 
 
entity my_counter is 
port ( 
    Clk   : in STD_LOGIC; 
    CE  : in STD_LOGIC; 
    CLR : in STD_LOGIC; 
    Q   : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(31 downto 0) 
    ); 
end my_counter; 
 
architecture arch_count of my_counter is 
 
  signal COUNT : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(31 downto 0) := (others => '0'); 
   
begin 
 
process(Clk, CLR) 
begin 
  if (CLR='1') then 
    COUNT <= (others => '0'); 
  elsif (Clk'event and Clk = '1') then 
    if (CE='1') then  
      COUNT <= COUNT+1; 
    end if; 
  end if; 
end process; 
 
Q   <= COUNT; 
 
end arch_count; 
 
 
-----Cell MUX ------------------------------ 
--entity that is a mux for the PUF 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all; 
use IEEE.std_logic_arith.all; 
use IEEE.std_logic_unsigned.all; 
 
ENTITY  mux_gen IS 
    GENERIC (Sel_Size : INTEGER :=8); 
   PORT (Sel         : IN  STD_LOGIC_Vector(Sel_Size-1 downto 0); 
         dati        : IN  STD_LOGIC_Vector(2**Sel_Size-1 downto 0); 
         dato        : OUT STD_LOGIC 
        ); 
END mux_gen; 
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ARCHITECTURE archmux OF mux_gen IS 
 
BEGIN  
 
    dato <= dati(conv_integer(sel)); 
      
END archmux; 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
----Main Code for Puf Bit----------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL; 
 
---Sel_size_p:The width of the selector for mux and decoder 
---row:used by upper level entity to assign this PUF a row number 
-------to allow for easier attribution of location to each RO on FPGA 
 
---en: Enables the RO 
---selA: Select an RO 
---selB: Select another RO for comparison to the first 
---aclr: Clears counter that counts oscillations 
---cnt_en: enables the counter. 
---res: The result of the comparisons between 2 counters. 1 if RO A> RO 
B 
entity puf_bit is 
    GENERIC (Sel_Size_p : INTEGER :=8; 
                 row : INTEGER :=1); 
    Port ( en : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           selA : in  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (Sel_Size_p-1 downto 0); 
           selB : in  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (Sel_Size_p-1 downto 0); 
           aclr : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           cnt_en : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           res : out  STD_LOGIC); 
end puf_bit; 
 
architecture Behavioral of puf_bit is 
 
 
component my_counter is 
port ( 
    Clk   : in STD_LOGIC; 
    CE  : in STD_LOGIC; 
    CLR : in STD_LOGIC; 
    Q   : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(31 downto 0) 
    ); 
end component; 
 
component  mux_gen IS 
    GENERIC (Sel_Size : INTEGER :=8); 
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   PORT (Sel         : IN  STD_LOGIC_Vector(Sel_Size-1 downto 0); 
         dati        : IN  STD_LOGIC_Vector(2**Sel_Size-1 downto 0); 
         dato        : OUT STD_LOGIC 
        ); 
END component; 
 
component Decoder is 
  generic (Sel_Width : integer := 8); 
  port( en: in std_logic; 
        inA, inB: in std_logic_vector(Sel_Width-1 downto 0); 
        output: out std_logic_vector(2**Sel_Width-1 downto 0)); 
      
end component; 
 
component RO_Array is 
  generic (RO_Width : integer := 64; 
              ro_row: integer :=1 ); 
  port( En: in std_logic_vector(RO_Width-1 downto 0); 
        Os: out std_logic_vector(RO_Width-1 downto 0)); 
      
end component; 
 
 
component my_COMPARE is 
port( 
    A, B   : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
    GTh  : out std_logic 
  ); 
end component; 
 
signal decout : std_logic_vector(2**Sel_size_p-1 downto 0); 
signal RO_out : std_logic_vector(2**Sel_size_p-1 downto 0); 
signal cntA, cntB : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
signal muxa,muxb : std_logic; 
 
begin 
 
dec :decoder GENERIC MAP(Sel_Width => Sel_size_p) 
            PORT MAP(en=>en, 
                        inA=>selA, 
                        inB=>selB, 
                        output=>decout); 
                         
ro_Ar :RO_Array GENERIC MAP(RO_Width => 2**Sel_size_p, 
                                     ro_row=>row) 
            PORT MAP(en=>decout, 
                        os=>RO_out); 
                         
mux_a :mux_gen GENERIC MAP(sel_size => Sel_size_p) 
            PORT MAP(sel=>selA, 
                        dati=>RO_out, 
                        dato=>muxa); 
                         
mux_b :mux_gen GENERIC MAP(sel_size => Sel_size_p) 
            PORT MAP(sel=>selB, 
                        dati=>RO_out, 
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                        dato=>muxb); 
                         
countA: my_counter PORT MAP( 
                        Clk=>muxa, 
                        CE=>cnt_en, 
                        CLR=>aclr, 
                        Q=>cntA); 
                         
countB :my_counter PORT MAP( 
                        Clk=>muxb, 
                        CE=>cnt_en, 
                        CLR=>aclr, 
                        Q=>cntB); 
                         
comp :my_COMPARE PORT MAP( 
                        A=>cntA, 
                        B=>cntB, 
                        Gth=>res); 
 
 
end Behavioral; 
 
8.4. PUF Array 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.all; 
 
---puf_width: The amount of PUFs to have in parallel 
---sel_width_ar:The select width for the mux and decoders in PUF 
 
 
---en_ar: Enables the RO 
---aclr_ar: Clears counters that counts oscillations 
---cnt_en_ar: enables the counters. 
---selA: Select an RO 
---selB: Select another RO for comparison to the first 
---res_ar: The result of the comparisons between 2 counters. 1 if RO A> 
RO B 
entity PUF_Array is 
  generic (puf_Width : integer := 8; 
           sel_width_ar : integer := 8); 
  port( en_ar, aclr_ar, cnt_en_ar: in std_logic; 
        selA : IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(sel_width_ar - 1 DOWNTO 0); 
        selB : IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(sel_width_ar - 1 DOWNTO 0); 
        res_ar: out std_logic_vector(puf_Width - 1 downto 0)); 
      
end PUF_Array; 
 
architecture block_diagram of PUF_Array is 
 
    COMPONENT puf_bit 
    GENERIC (Sel_Size_p : INTEGER; 
                 row : INTEGER 
            ); 
    PORT(   en : in  STD_LOGIC; 
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           selA : in  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (Sel_Size_p-1 downto 0); 
           selB : in  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (Sel_Size_p-1 downto 0); 
           aclr : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           cnt_en : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           res : out  STD_LOGIC); 
    END COMPONENT; 
 
    begin 
     
    GEN_puf:  
    for I in 0 to puf_Width-1 generate 
      pufX :puf_bit 
            GENERIC MAP(Sel_Size_p  => sel_width_ar, 
                                row =>I) 
            PORT MAP( 
                     en => en_ar, 
                     selA => selA, 
                     selB => selB, 
                     aclr => aclr_ar, 
                     cnt_en => cnt_en_ar, 
                     Res => res_ar(I)); 
    end generate GEN_puf; 
 
end block_diagram; 
 
8.5. PUF State Machine 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee.std_logic_1164.all; 
 
---delay: The amount of clock cycles to leave the RO enabled for. 
 
---clock: a clock for this state machine 
---w: Allows the state machine to leave the start state when high 
---reset:resets the state machine to the start state 
---en:output that enable RO 
---a_clr:output that clears PUF counters 
---cnt_en_ar:output that enables PUF counters to increment 
ENTITY PUF_Machine IS 
  generic (delay : integer := 100); 
  PORT ( clock, w, Reset      : in std_logic; 
           en, a_clr, cnt_en_ar : out std_logic); 
END PUF_Machine; 
 
 
ARCHITECTURE Behavior OF PUF_Machine IS 
  TYPE State_type IS (start, clear, enable, disable); 
  SIGNAL current_state, next_state : State_type :=start; 
  SIGNAL counter : integer range 0 to delay-1 := 0; 
  SIGNAL cnt_reset, cnt_en : std_logic; 
   
BEGIN 
 
  PROCESS (w, current_state, counter) -- state table 
  BEGIN 
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       case current_state IS 
           WHEN start => --wait here for w input of 1 
                IF (w = '0') THEN  
                    next_state <= start; 
                ELSif(w = '1') then 
                    next_state <= clear; 
                END IF; 
           WHEN clear => --clear the counters in the RO PUF 
                next_state <= enable; 
           WHEN enable => --This is a delay state to allow PUF to count 
                if (counter = delay-1) then 
                    next_state <= disable; 
                else 
                    next_state <= enable; 
                end if; 
           WHEN disable => --disable PUF and wait for w input to be 0 
                IF (w = '1') THEN  
                    next_state <= disable; 
                ELSif(w = '0') then 
                    next_state <= start; 
                END IF;                 
       END CASE; 
  END PROCESS; -- state table 
   
   
  PROCESS (Clock, reset) -- state flip-flops 
  BEGIN 
       if (reset='1') then 
            current_state<=start; 
       elsif (rising_edge(clock)) then 
            current_state<=next_state; 
       end if; 
  END PROCESS; 
   
  PROCESS (Clock, cnt_reset, cnt_en, counter) -- state flip-flops 
  BEGIN 
       if (cnt_reset='1') then 
            counter <= 0; 
       elsif (rising_edge(clock) and cnt_en = '1' and counter /= delay-
1) then 
            counter <= counter + 1; 
       end if; 
  END PROCESS; 
   
  PROCESS (current_state) -- assign output values 
  BEGIN 
       case current_state IS 
           WHEN start => 
                en<='0'; 
                a_clr<='0'; 
                cnt_en_ar<='0'; 
                cnt_reset<='1'; 
                cnt_en<='0'; 
           WHEN clear => --set clear up 
                en<='0'; 
                a_clr<='1'; 
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                cnt_en_ar<='0'; 
                cnt_reset<='1'; 
                cnt_en<='0'; 
           WHEN enable => --set enable up; reset clear down 
                en<='1'; 
                a_clr<='0'; 
                cnt_en_ar<='1'; 
                cnt_reset<='0'; 
                cnt_en<='1'; 
           WHEN disable => --disable en 
                en<='0'; 
                a_clr<='0';    
                cnt_en_ar<='0';  
                cnt_reset<='0'; 
                cnt_en<='0';            
       END CASE; 
  END PROCESS; 
   
   
END Behavior; 
8.6. Main: Ring Oscillator PUF 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL; 
 
---delay_clk: The amount of clock cycles to allow enable to be on. 
---ro_PUF_width:The amount of PUFs to have in parallel 
---RO_sel: The width of the selector for PUF mux and decoder 
 
---clock:Clock for the state machine 
---w:Allows the state machine to leave the start state on high. 
---reset: resets the state machine back to start state 
---selA: Select an RO 
---selB: Select another RO for comparison to the first 
---res_ar: The result of each PUF. 
entity RO_PUF_Main is 
  generic ( delay_clk : integer := 125000; 
                ro_PUF_width : integer := 8; 
                RO_sel : integer  := 2); 
    Port ( clock, w, reset : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           selA, selB : in  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (RO_sel-1 downto 0); 
           res_ar : out  STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (ro_PUF_width-1 downto 0)); 
end RO_PUF_Main; 
 
architecture Behavioral of RO_PUF_Main is 
 
component PUF_Machine IS 
  generic (delay : integer := 125000); 
  PORT ( clock,w,Reset : in std_logic; 
         en,a_clr,cnt_en_ar : out std_logic); 
END component; 
 
component PUF_Array is 
  generic (puf_Width : integer := 8; 
           sel_width_ar : integer := 8); 
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  port( en_ar, aclr_ar, cnt_en_ar: in std_logic; 
        selA : IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(sel_width_ar - 1 DOWNTO 0); 
        selB : IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(sel_width_ar - 1 DOWNTO 0); 
        res_ar: out std_logic_vector(puf_Width - 1 downto 0));  
end component; 
 
signal m_en, m_clr, m_cnt_en : std_logic; 
 
begin 
 
state_mac :PUF_Machine GENERIC MAP(delay => delay_clk) 
            PORT MAP(clock => clock, 
                        w => w, 
                        Reset => reset, 
                        en=>m_en, 
                        a_clr=>m_clr, 
                        cnt_en_ar=>m_cnt_en 
                        ); 
                 
 
puf_ar :PUF_Array GENERIC MAP(puf_width => ro_PUF_width, 
                                        sel_width_ar=>RO_sel) 
            PORT MAP(en_ar=>m_en, 
                        aclr_ar=>m_clr, 
                        cnt_en_ar=>m_cnt_en, 
                        selA=>selA, 
                        selB=>selB, 
                        res_ar=>res_ar 
                        ); 
 
 
end Behavioral; 
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